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

PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

War, Strategy and Maritime Power

by

Edward Luttwak*

What is a navy in the absence of a maritime strategy? The United States has interests overseas in need of naval protection, and it also depends on much commercial traffic that is maritime. The United States has a large, if diminished, inventory of warships and auxiliaries, as well as sundry ancillary air forces and many shore facilities variously related to naval functions. Just over 500,000 people in uniform operate and administer these ships, aircraft and shore facilities, and another 200,000 operate a complete, self-contained armed force historically associated with amphibious operations, and now still administratively associated with the naval force as such. But the one thing that the United States plainly lacks is a maritime strategy.

What is a navy in the absence of a strategy? It is, in effect, a priesthood. Ships, aircraft and facilities are maintained, as temples are kept clean, repaired and repainted. Fleets are rotated from home bases to overseas deployment areas, and then back again, as liturgical services are performed at set hours, in the days set by the priestly calendar. Routine ceremonies alternate with the consecration of new ships, and with the introduction of new devices, much as new temples are from time to time commissioned to replace those beyond repair, or to augment their number when faith is on the rise, and the harvest gods have been kind. In all priesthoods there are degrees: some priests are confined to the supervision of the lesser sanctuaries of rustic gods; others are deemed elevated enough to officiate at the inner altars where the most powerful gods reside; the analogy with the nuclear guardians in our Navy need not be belabored.

The priests of ancient pagan faiths had many complex tasks, but it was no part of their duty to ask why the sacrifices were made and the prayers chanted. Nor could they question the wisdom of rites or suggest better ways of appeasing the gods. As for those outside the priesthood, they were disqualified to ask questions by their lack of knowledge of the secrets of the faith. And so we ourselves continue with the upkeep of the ships, aircraft and facilities and with their ritual movements—year after year—never asking fundamental questions about our purposes and methods.

Sometimes the peasants rebel and refuse to pay the tithes exacted for the

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building of replacement temples; sometimes they react at the cost of some new idol made of exotic materials by expensive craftsmen. Then the members of the priesthood unite in their corporate solidarity to evoke all the sinister dangers that will attend the diminution of the number of temples, or the reduction of their magnificence. Sometimes the peasants are successfully intimidated, and are frightened into paying homage in hard cash; at other times it is the priests who give up, and then they take care not to undermine faith in the temples and idols still in hand, and so they refrain from insisting on the dangers of the gods left unappeased or by temples not built.

What else can a navy do but perform as best it can as a priesthood, if it has no maritime strategy? For only in a strategy may rational ideas be found to inform the choice of sea and air platforms, to provide meaningful guidelines for subsystem design priorities, and to define the pattern of requisite deployments.

A navy in being is a necessary condition of any maritime strategy but is not a substitute for such. Ever since the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy the U.S. Navy has had to live without a comprehensive strategy. Now that there is a growing Soviet Navy of already impressive proportions, it may seem that a strategy for the U.S. Navy could be found effortlessly, by summing the requirements of defeating the Soviet Navy. Unfortunately this easy answer is foreclosed: the Soviet Navy itself can find sufficient strategy in the neutralization of American naval power and its alliance adjuncts, but the latter in turn must accomplish positive purposes, and cannot exhaust their function in neutralizing Soviet naval strength.

The United States thus unavoidably needs a positive maritime strategy, i.e., a coherent statement of its own role in the world with a consequent delineation of the maritime requirements of this role. (Maritime rather than merely naval, because to a large extent naval *force* is merely the protective framework for the use of oceans in all its aspects.) The source of the problem is no mystery: we have no maritime strategy because we have no *national* strategy. But this in turn is no excuse for the failure of the U.S. Navy as a corporate body to formulate a coherent strategy. It merely means that the maritime strategy must be defined in terms of a *presumptive* national strategy, in the hope that the nation will indeed accept the logic of the former, even if it does not fully acknowledge the latter. But this most basic of tasks continues to be evaded. Preoccupied with purely managerial problems, absorbed by the narrow thoughts of bureaucratic role-playing, determined to promote these bureaucratic interests through the substrategic devices of systems analysis and all the other numbers games, much more interested in new technology than in the purposeful operation of *all* technologies (and only strategy may confer purpose on mere technicity) our higher naval leadership has not even seriously tried to develop the intellectual structure of a maritime strategy. In some cases there has been the belief that the mere listing of "missions" is a substitute; in others faith has been placed in *posture statements* poised to exploit the latest headlines (e.g., oil in FY 1975 and 1976). It is true that both the internal customs of resource allocation in the Department of Defense, and also our congressional budgetary process demand specifics and are structured to reject rational strategic discourse, as the latter cannot be quantified. The mindless insistence on numbers, even when the absence of a strategic context makes the numbers meaningless is a fact of life. But there is no reason why the Navy cannot develop its own internal strategic discourse and eventually present its own analysis of the nation's maritime needs, even while continuing to feed all

the bookkeepers and slide-rule artists with the deceptively precise numbers that they crave. One must hope that the corrosion of the minds caused by bureaucratic factionalism has not so far developed that the Navy is now in fact incapable of true strategic discourse.

*War, Strategy and Maritime Power** is not a statement of naval strategy, nor is it a strategical treatise such as would serve directly to guide the formulation of an American naval strategy. It is, however, a most valuable source book that could be of much use to inform the strategic discourse now long overdue. The first group of essays by Bernard Knox, Gordon Turner, Basil Liddell Hart and Norman Gibbs makes a good introduction by addressing the broader problem of war and peace; except for Liddell Hart's notoriously ignorant misapprehension of Clausewitz (he deplores the fellow, plainly never having read him) it is all solid stuff, in a historical vein. The next section has pieces by Herbert Rosinski, Henry Eccles, James Field, and William Reitzel; it focuses more directly on the nature and purposes of strategy itself. Rosinski's contribution amounts to a lucid miniessay that offers what I believe to be the best brief definition of strategy itself, in contradistinction to tactics ("strategy is the comprehensive direction of power; tactics is its immediate application"). Eccles pursues at much greater length and to good purpose the definitional route; neither good nor bad, his contribution is simply basic, and reflects a sustained interest in the fundamentals of strategy that is itself a valuable rarity among us.

The essays by Field and Reitzel, not to be summarized here, are concerned more closely with the specifically naval aspect, but their focus is on the history of naval strategy rather than on naval strategy *tout court*. What follows after this in the book is a long series of diverse case studies and essays of reappraisal, including Stephen Ambrose on seapower in the two World Wars, Martin Blumenson on the continuities and contrasts between the two World Wars, and the editor's own essay on the rearmament of Germany, or rather its immediate prelude. Brisk and well-written, it is a useful piece of work even for those who have no interest in the past, because it is now easy to see that the issues of 1950-54 are about to reemerge in full force, one way or the other. Readers will want to explore the remaining rich menu of essays on strategic, military, and politicomilitary issues. Necessarily uneven, the average standard is nevertheless high.

*B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed. *War, Strategy and Maritime Power*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977, 356pp. A collection of articles and essays on strategy and maritime power that have appeared in the *Naval War College Review*, selected and edited by a former editor of the *Review*.

BOOK REVIEWS

Banks, Arthur S., ed. *Political Handbook of the World: 1978.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 627pp.

This is an extremely useful reference work for anyone who desires a convenient encapsulated description of the governmental structures, the political elites, and the history and demography of the nations of the world, together with a short synopsis of the most pressing issues with which each must deal. Of particular interest is the listing of the major political parties of each nation along with each party's prominent leaders. This work also identifies each party's legislative strength and in those nations that adhere to the parliamentary system of government, the governing party is listed. In those parliamentary nations where no party commands a majority in the legislature, the *Handbook* names those parties that constitute the governing coalition.

The description of the nations is highly readable. The work suffers from drawbacks identical to those of other handbooks of this type. Because the world is changing so rapidly, both in the internal political composition of nations as well as the number of nations, the book becomes outdated almost as soon as it is published. Even publishing a new edition each year does not enable the publisher to remain absolutely current.

I found that a major factor distinguishing this work from the ordinary almanac or political handbook is the inclusion of an introduction of the major problems and issues that affect bilateral and multilateral relationships between and among nations on a regional basis. By following this regional formula, some problems or issues peculiar to a particular area of the world are investigated, whereas if one were to attempt to spotlight only global problems, many of these issues would be overlooked. The division of the world into regions for this purpose also lessens the probability that the ethnocentrism of the editors governed the selection of issues deemed important enough to identify.

Another factor enhancing this work is the description of the composition and operation of a significant number of international organizations. The inclusion of this section enables one to have a ready reference to the multitude of these organizations that play such an important role in the various international relationships throughout the world.

I highly recommend the *Political Handbook of the World: 1978* as a comprehensive reference tool. It is well worth the cost.

EVAN M. JONES
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Barnds, William J., ed. *China and America: The Search for a New Relationship.* New York: New York University Press, 1977. 254pp.

This book is a series of professional papers presented at the 1975-76 Council on Foreign Affairs session on the development of Sino-American relations. Dealing with past and present issues, the papers analyze Sino-American relations and propose future direction for American foreign policy.

The introductory chapter, written by the editor, gives a foundation for current political patterns in the normalization of Sino-American relations. The chapter skeptically appraises the possibility of an East-West alliance.

Akira Iriye wrote the second chapter on how the People's Republic of China (PRC) views the United States in Chinese foreign policy. Presenting an historical background by dividing the period between 1930 to the present into six identifiable segments, Iriye defines the contemporary issues. Drawing the conclusion that PRC-U.S. relations his-

torically have been characterized by misunderstandings and wars, Iriye foresees the PRC trying to insure a stable relationship so that it can concentrate on internal developments.

An interesting theory Iriye develops is that the PRC does not recognize the United States in a bilateral relationship but as a major determinant in Asian and worldwide affairs. By rejecting a bilateral relationship, the PRC hopes to promote its own international esteem through increased contacts with the United States, while seeking to prevent U.S. affiliations with powers that are potential enemies of the PRC. Examples cited as a threat to the PRC are potential U.S.-Soviet, or U.S.-Taiwan alliances.

The next two chapters evaluate the tangible agreements between the PRC and the United States for the improvement of economic and cultural exchanges. Alexander Eckstein's chapter on Sino-American economic relations explains the development of trade between these two nations, its potentials and barriers. The major emphasis in this chapter is to develop a policy in which trade could expand at a moderate rate. Currently, though, there are many obstacles hindering bilateral trade. For example, under the conditions of the Jackson-Vanick amendment of the 1974 Trade Act, credit and "most favored nation" treatment is not granted to the PRC. Another area of concern is the narrow U.S. market for goods from the PRC, resulting in a trade deficit for the PRC. The conclusion drawn is that if these and other issues are resolved, economic policy would be the determining factor in future Sino-American relations.

Lucien Pye's chapter on building a relation on cultural exchanges suggests that such exchanges are the most convenient way to build a natural bridge of communication between the PRC and the United States. To date, cultural exchanges have been limited and to increase the exchanges both countries must first recognize their different expectations. Pye concludes that if the United States responds to the PRC's desire for exposure to U.S. technology and the PRC satisfies the U.S. need for intellectual exchanges in the field of the humanities and social science, future exchanges will be encouraged.

In the fifth chapter, Ralph N. Clough discusses the Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations. He argues that the United States will be unable to establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC unless it withdraws all support from Taiwan. On the other hand, Clough implies that if the United States breaks its present security treaty with Taiwan then the United States will lose its credibility among such Asian nations as South Korea and Japan. Clough successfully states the problem, but fails to suggest solutions other than to advocate a policy of making Taiwan independent of the United States while developing diplomatic relations with the PRC.

An interesting argument that Clough presents is the effect of Sino-Soviet relations on the issue of Taiwan. Clough is convinced that as long as tensions exist between the Soviet Union and the PRC, the United States can sustain informal relations with Taiwan, but if Sino-Soviet relations improve, the PRC could pressure U.S. involvement in Taiwan by jeopardizing U.S.-PRC relations. Presently the United States has time to develop a solution, but the question is how much time?

William J. Barnds concludes the book with a final chapter on China in American foreign policy. Taking into consideration that the PRC has both historical and current grievances with the United States, Barnds suggests that the United States should first establish strong credibility among its Asian allies and then gradually establish increased relations with the PRC. If this solution is accepted, I foresee a balance of power struggle in Asia resulting in Sino-

American relations which are more competitive than cooperative.

Using professional papers written by the leading Chinese-American specialists, the editor offers a book that provides both a broad understanding and varied opinions on a widely controversial subject. Thoughtful readers will find *China and America: The Search for a New Relationship* valuable background for examining Sino-American relations and their importance in world affairs.

MARTHA WALLS
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Blechman, Barry M. and Berman, Robert P., eds. *Guide to Far Eastern Navies.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 586pp.

Although perhaps better titled, "Guide to East Asian Navies," this regional look at the navies of China, Japan, the two Koreas, the Philippines and Taiwan is a refreshing attempt to provide more than just a compilation of photographs and technical data. To achieve this, the book is divided into two distinct parts. The first, comprising slightly more than half the pages, is a series of essays, each dealing with one of the six subject navies and written by individuals of different naval repute, including Norman Polmar writing on the two Koreas. One could question the inclusion of the Philippine Navy in this work in terms of locale, capability and interaction with the other navies; but the essay is informative. Part II of the book contains the usual photographs, silhouettes and technical data on ships and aircraft. While not quite as detailed as some of its larger counterparts, it is adequate.

The significance of this naval guide then lies in Part I. The editors hope to inform the reader "about the quality of each force, its strengths and weaknesses, the role it plays in peacetime in support of foreign policy and its potential wartime roles, and how it is likely to evolve in the future." That is no mean task, considering the complexity of such countries as China, Japan and Korea, but it is carried off reasonably well. As might be expected, however, there are as many new questions raised as old ones answered. This is not really so much a fault of the authors and editors as it is a reflection of the realities of the region. Only the most intrepid of analysts or futurists would dare to predict which of the various options available to the nations of the area will, in fact, be pursued, how these will affect the selection of options by the others, and how this interaction will influence naval forces. None of the authors appears this intrepid; thus, what is presented is a menu of possibilities for the future that the reader may or may not find reasonable. Yet it may well be that these uncertainties are precisely what makes this work a timely and significant contribution, as suggested by Admiral Zumwalt in his Foreword.

Notwithstanding the uncertainties of the future, the historical perspective and commentary on the present status and roles of these navies is solid. It is here that the naval reader and layman alike will find most items of interest, although this may reflect this operator's penchant for fact over hypothesis. Despite the multiple author approach, two themes suggest themselves throughout the essays. The navies, as they exist today, reflect post-World War II political realities rather than traditional Western naval concepts. For example, if the size of one's navy has traditionally been held to be a reflection of one's maritime interests, then Japan, with worldwide trading interests and significant dependence on the sea as a source of food, should maintain a navy with global reach. Instead, reflecting the political reaction to the experience and results of WW II and her American-imposed Constitution, Japan maintains only a Maritime Self-Defense Force, credible in home waters, but lacking any real open ocean capability. China, with a merchant

marine of some 550 ships and growing continues to rely on a coastal navy more suited to a form of guerrilla war at sea than a traditional sea control role. In this case, fiscal and technological constraints also may play a role, although the implication is that they are not dominant. There are signs of change, but any new direction must await the results of the current internal debate on modernization. What grows on the reader is a perception of East Asian interest in a continued U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific to guarantee what they are unwilling or unable to protect.

The second thread is a sense of a regional naval balance in which each of the navies, less the Philippines, is evaluated as being effective in defending its own home waters while posing no credible offensive threat against any other. One gets an eerie feeling of 1922 naval ratios achieved by happenstance rather than agreement. What this means, of course, is that the dominant naval forces in the area are those of the U.S. 7th Fleet and the Soviet Pacific Fleet. This issue is handled in a lead essay, written by the editors, that provides a rather gross comparison of the two forces and postulates how they might interact with each other and with the navies of the region. This chapter seems rather shallow with too many caveats. Had it been placed at the end of the section as a wrap-up, rather than a lead-in, it would have proven far more effective. Such statements as "The size of the U.S. Navy will increase in the future, as the growth in U.S. shipbuilding appropriations, initiated in the early 1970s, results in greater numbers of new ships, while the Soviet Navy, facing a worsening obsolescence problem in submarine and major warships, will become smaller," will cause a raising of eyebrows.

On balance, *Guide to Far Eastern Navies* achieves its stated purpose of providing a dynamic view of the navies of East Asia rather than the typical snapshot. It remains to be seen whether it is the forerunner of a series of regional guides and how such volumes may be kept current. For now, this one is worth the readers' attention.

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Buchanan, A. Russell. *Black Americans in World War II.* Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1977. 148pp.

World War II profoundly affected black Americans. In spite of the racism, segregation, discrimination, and frustration that blacks experienced, the war engendered a racial awareness and brought about great changes in their status. Many of the advances of the Civil Rights revolution began during the war. This story of promise, challenge, and change is the subject of A. Russell Buchanan's short, descriptive volume, *Black Americans in World War II.* Although derived mainly from secondary sources, the book does show the author's research in the papers of the NAACP and National Urban League. Those papers, however, are sometimes used to the exclusion of such other equally important sources as the black press. During the war the black press had an important influence on both black and white America, in spite of Buchanan's contention that it did not reach the masses, and this point demonstrates one of the major problems when an author depends too heavily on too few primary sources.

Black Americans in World War II contains nine topic chapters and a summary but there is little continuity between chapters, and each is without any significant introduction or conclusion. Still, the chapters do relate a rather interesting and exciting history, pointing out the different racial conditions in the north and south, the March on Washington Movement, violence in 1943, black women, the unique situation in the military, and the Double V campaign. The work contains little analysis or interpretation, being pri-

marily a summary of progress which occurred during the war. Perhaps this reviewer's main criticism is the location of the discussion of the Double V, which is the last chapter before the conclusion. To understand fully the essence of black feelings and protest during the war, one must comprehend the concept of the Double V—victory over fascism abroad and racism at home. Blacks understood this idea much better than whites and used it effectively. Thus, any study of blacks during World War II should follow an early analysis of the Double V. (The *Pittsburgh Courier* was the main force behind the Double V but Buchanan does not mention this fact, another indication of the overuse of NAACP papers.)

The three chapters on blacks in the military are good summaries, although the account of World War I is somewhat muddled and there is an overuse of Ulysses Lee's *The Employment of Negro Troops*. Blacks participated in the war effort but had to face difficulties that whites never did. Progress in the services owed much to pressure by the black community and a perseverance by black members of the armed forces. Real progress was slow indeed, but the result by the end of the war was a more receptive military establishment ready to move toward integration.

In spite of many weaknesses and a high price ($14.95), this study is a basic introduction to and summary of the changes which occurred in the black community during World War II. It offers a good concise history for the general reader.

ALAN M. OSUR
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Buckley, Alan D., ed. "International Terrorism," *Journal of International Affairs*. Spring/Summer 1978. 163pp.

It is somewhat unusual for a journal number to be the subject of a book review, but when a journal treats one topic at book-length, it offers the reader the equivalent of an edited book and it probably should be treated as such. "International Terrorism" is a solid, well-edited collection of articles that treats the problem of terrorism from a number of interesting perspectives.

Richard Shultz offers a useful, if not definitive, typology of political terrorism that distinguishes three basic types of the phenomenon—revolutionary, subrevolutionary and establishment—and then proposes that these three types be examined by variation according to cause, environment, goals, strategy, means, organization and the nature of participants. The value of the proposal is that it offers some basis for hope that the study of terrorism can move somewhat beyond the descriptive and journalistic treatments that are currently in vogue.

Bard O'Neill of the National Defense University applies the Schultz typology (with refinements) in a competent and provocative essay treating the Palestinian Resistance Movement. After providing a straightforward reconstruction of the development of Palestinian-Arab nationalism, O'Neill attempts to explain the emergence of fedayeen terrorism. He finds that Palestinian terror has been resultant of long-term causes—ideology and relative deprivation—and a short-term factor that he calls "capacity reduction." Capacity reduction is said to be the product of bad fedayeen strategy, poor physical and human conditions for insurgency, poor organization, effective counterinsurgency, and limited assets. Capacity reduction in turn helps explain terrorism.

There are a few problems with O'Neill's argument that really demand attention. If the article were insignificant, we could ignore these criticisms, but it is a good contribution to the literature and accordingly demands our attention.

First, Schultz offers a typology (i.e., a "systematic ordering and classification of empirical data"). To the extent that

Schultz is successful, his typology will contribute to a coherent comparison between terrorist groups, thus Schultz has offered a static schema. However, O'Neill has taken Schultz' descriptive tools and employed them as if they explained—rather than described—terrorism. Second, and more importantly, O'Neill's "capability reduction" is not a static condition but rather a process in which the terrorism phenomenon is a result. What this argument ignores is the fact that the fedayeen have always had minimal capabilities vis-a-vis Israel, and indeed it may be argued that fedayeen activism through terrorism has resulted in capability *enhancement* (especially if one takes a broad view of capability).

Thirdly, terrorism has frequently been the harbinger of political struggle, or at least symptomatic of the first stages of revolution, especially in circumstances in which there is a gross disparity in relative strengths. Terrorism is the weapon of the weak, and we might say the weapon of those who have suffered "capability reductions" at some point, but that would be tautological. As the reader can guess, O'Neill's article deserves attention, warts and all, for it attempts to address terrorism systematically, a not unimportant example for others specializing in the study of terrorism.

Richard Lebow follows with an interesting article tracing the "origins of sectarian assassination" in Belfast. Lebow's piece is nice as far as it goes, which is to say not earlier than this decade; but in a conflict with deep and aged roots such as that in Belfast, one would hope that Lebow continues his interest in this variant of terrorism and delves rather more deeply than the contemporary period.

The most important contribution in "International Terrorism" is provided by Robert K. Mullen, whose article "Mass Destruction and Terrorism" is no doubt one of the best analyses published to date on the macroterror problem (i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical). Mullen offers an informed—and thus rare—discussion of chemical and biological agents with mass destructive capabilities and proceeds to identify the production and (not inconsiderable) delivery considerations that will confront the prospective macroterrorist. His presentation supports his conclusion that mass destruction threats from terrorists are "vanishingly remote."

Contributions by Paul A. Tharp and Yonah Alexander deserve the reader's attention, and those familiar with Brian Jenkins' important work on terrorism will not be disappointed by his concluding "Trends and Potentialities" article.

In summary, the *Journal of International Affairs* has produced a worthwhile and inexpensive "book" that deserves the attention of those concerned with the malady of terrorism.

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Carrillo, Santiago. *Eurocommunism and the State*, translated by Nan Green and A.M. Elliot. Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1978. 172pp.

Eurocommunism and the State is a translation from the Spanish of *Eurocommunismo y Estado* by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain. It forms a significant primary source, in English, of the political philosophy of Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish Communist Party, and Eurocommunism.

The author outlines in the book his reasons for claiming that Eurocommunism is neither traditional communism nor Social Democracy. His most essential thesis is that the world today is fundamentally different from the times of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and therefore a new political concept is needed.

Among the examples Carrillo uses to document the crucial changes in the

world is his view that the state is no longer representative of one sector of the society (the bourgeoisie) but now a much smaller technological elite. It is this elite that manipulates the state rather than an entire class. Carrillo further outlines the religious, social, political, and cultural aspects of the state that are undergoing a series of crises in Spain and Europe. He then proposes to exploit these crises and use them against the dominating elite to achieve a change in the state. Underlying this change is the premise that violence is no longer a productive method of achieving political goals in Europe.

One component of state power that Carrillo writes on in detail is the armed forces. Carrillo recognizes that change is not possible without altering the present role of the military but that it must not be directly confronted. Instead he proposes a series of actions that would tend to neutralize its influence, integrate it further with the rest of society, and attempt to replace traditional values with new ones.

The book is filled with the standard claims of Eurocommunism similar to those found in France and Italy. These include an acceptance of the peaceful road to power, a pluralistic political system, mass parties, decentralism, a reduction in both military blocs in Europe, rejection of the Soviet 1917 model for change, acceptance for long-term private property, and rejection of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without this last essential ingredient, a good case can be made for Eurocommunist theory being closer to Social Democracy than to communism.

Carrillo does maintain that the long-range goals of communism have not been abandoned. His writings reflect his acceptance of the Soviet Union as a fraternal leader, the basic class antagonism common to most Communist writings, dialectics, and historical materialism. He further attempts to present Eurocommunism as another in a series of revisions to the basic ideology.

The book is well organized and appears to have suffered little from the translation. It lacks an index and could be better footnoted. The work has been severely criticized by the Soviets in the journal *New Times*.

JAMES JOHN TRITTEN
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Duffy, Christopher. *Austerlitz 1805*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1977. 194pp.

Austerlitz was one of Napoleon's greatest triumphs. Fought precisely 1 year after his assumption of the Imperial title, it was his first victory of annihilation. His 1796-97 Italian campaign witnessed a series of rapid partial victories. No single engagement was decisive. It was the cumulative effect of numerous battles that forced the Austrians to sue for peace. In the campaign of 1800, the war went on for nearly a year after Marengo. The Battle of Austerlitz lasted one day, and the Austro-Russian Army was completely shattered. Moreover, Austerlitz led directly to the collapse of the Third Coalition. Austria sued for peace and the Russians limped home.

Christopher Duffy provides a clear, concise narrative of the campaign leading up to the battle and of the engagement itself. He also notes that Napoleon did not operate with a fixed plan that ignored the independent will of the enemy. Rather, the Emperor devised a general approach that called for his forces to lure the allies to attack the French right. Napoleon would then deliver a counterstroke with his center and left. During the battle, the left was unable to launch a decisive blow, and Napoleon switched his main thrust to the center. The Emperor's genius then was not a matter of creating and following detailed precise schemes. The essence of Napoleonic strategy was the

ability to take advantage of rapidly shifting circumstances within the framework of a general plan.

Most people interested in military history have some idea of the course of the battle and of the legends surrounding it. Duffy explodes many of these legends. For example, the story that thousands of Russians drowned in the lakes on the southern edge of the battlefield is simply not true. More important, however, is the fact that the author gives a fine analysis of both the battle and Napoleon's generalship.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

Freedman, Lawrence. *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 235pp.

This book is a valuable primer for anyone interested in understanding the issues involved in strategic arms negotiations. Although Freedman's effort leaves quite a bit to be desired, he does succeed in weaving a generally coherent picture of the process of U.S. strategic arms policy development during the last two decades. This is no small feat if one considers, as Freedman does, the long roster of "players" (Secretaries and Under Secretaries, Agency Directors, Representatives and Senators, Academics, Presidential advisors, generals and admirals, and "staffers" of every description) who were, at any given time, likely to be participants in this process. Far from being open to straightforward analysis, the interactions of these people were characterized by a complex interplay of institutional, political, and ideological motivations. Into this tapestry Freedman expertly weaves the story of the CIA and the other intelligence agencies as providers of the information and estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and programs.

In many ways, this "revised revision" of Freedman's Oxford D.Phil. thesis is a history of the CIA's apparatus for estimating the "strategic" capabilities of the Soviet Union. He traces the rising and falling influence of this apparatus principally embodied in the Office of National Estimates (ONE) through the early years (the fifties), the overestimations known as the "missile gap" (1960), to the underestimations of the mid to late sixties, and the final demise of the ONE in 1973. We see the formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961, and then Secretary of Defense McNamara's preference for CIA estimates to hold the military in "check." Later, Freedman describes the ascendance of the National Security Council (NSC) under Kissinger, in which the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced by the ONE were changed from a coordinated effort footnoted by dissenters (DIA, etc.), to one in which competing viewpoints were much less diluted and Kissinger and his NSC staff took over the interpretive role (expressing the conclusions in National Security Study Memoranda or NSSMs). I should note at this point that if the reader is beginning to gag on the acronyms, this is only a sample of what is in the book. Unfortunately, it is unavoidable. From another viewpoint, however, it is part of the story—the amazing regularity with which intelligence boards, panels, and studies have been formed and dissolved in the last 20 years, reflecting dissatisfaction (on the parts of different people at different times for different reasons) with what had previously existed.

The author convincingly describes the problem of the analyst(s) attempting to provide useful information, on a national scale, about an adversary in an environment in which it is assumed "... that the outside world is knowable, that it is the job of the intelligence officer to know it, and that if he fails to provide warning of some

external event then that is a reflection on his capabilities rather than the nature of the world." Making things even more difficult is the fact that the intelligence estimator's world is the world of the future, and that a "... judgment on what the Soviet Union will most likely build, by way of military equipment, requires some judgment on Soviet military objectives." As Freedman describes it, the estimator's response to this challenge is to approach an analysis with a "set of expectations" about the target country, or what he aptly names an "adversary image," through which capabilities and intentions are seen as interdependent. This is markedly different from the popular image of the cold-blooded, facts-only, watchdog of enemy behavior. A major theme of the book is that this concept of adversary image has played a key role in the continuing controversy in the United States over precisely what the Russians are up to and why.

About halfway through the book, the author presents what appears to be a central thesis: that the intelligence community was not really at fault in the consistent failures to assess accurately the Soviet strategic arms buildup of the sixties. Instead, he argues, the inaccurate estimates were caused by the Soviets continual modification and alteration of the program. He then embarks on a highly speculative assessment of Soviet thinking through a series of crises (U.S. ICBM buildup under Kennedy, Cuba, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic, U.S. ABM and MIRV development), each impelling them to make shifts in their program. Thus, the intelligence analysts were not to blame as they based projections on current capabilities that were always changing. This unnecessary defense of the intelligence community with a totally unsupported argument reflects a major weakness of the book, namely that a great deal of Freedman's analysis is highly speculative, or based upon unexplained sources. One explanation for this is offered at the beginning of the book, where the author advises that the "about 50" interviews he conducted in 1973 were confidential, that the information thus acquired was incorporated in the text without reference, and that the reader must accordingly "... take a certain amount on trust...."

Notwithstanding this criticism, the book is well worth reading for novices as well as old hands and specialists, first for its informed description of the strategic intelligence process, but more important because it grapples with the confusing, often esoteric world of modern weapons and the interaction of people and institutions that underlies U.S. strategic arms policy decisions.

G.J. KELLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Gabriel, Richard A. and Savage, Paul L. *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1978. 242pp.

This is a flawed book, one that many will discount because it falls short of fulfilling its academic and scholarly pretensions. Supporting data, frequently referred to, often fail to materialize; much opinion is advanced as fact; and there is a sometimes confusing melange of description, diagnosis and highly prescriptive assertion.

But to dismiss the book on these grounds would be to miss the point. The authors have something important to say, and it has relevance for all the services in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, post-McNamara era. There is something terribly wrong with the leadership and the professional climate in the Army today, they believe. These two, now academicians but each with some military service to draw upon, try to explain what has caused the problems and what can be done about them. In the process they are wrong about as

often as they are right, but they nevertheless provide a wealth of provocative and useful insights. The root cause of current problems is, as they see it, the harmful adoption of a managerial or entrepreneurial ethos by the officer corps in place of the traditional ethic of service. The resultant managerial careerism led in turn to distortion and fabrication of reports, self-interest instead of concern for the troops, the frenzied rotation of leaders, the tyranny of statistics, and eventually the loss of unit coherence. It was not the stress of combat in Vietnam, they hold, that caused the Army to disintegrate. Rather it was what the Army did to itself.

What, then, should be done about it? Gabriel and Savage have many suggestions, some of which come too late; we can't go back and pattern our units in Vietnam on the French *Groupes Mobiles,* for example. But they are essentially correct when they argue that "the case for reform was never made from within the officer corps itself and has yet to be made." (With the significant exception of the Army War College *Study on Military Professionalism.*) So their suggestions that "alternatives to resignation consistent with moral protest must be developed," that we could do with fewer officers and especially far fewer senior officers, that the frantic pace of moves and reassignments must be drastically reduced, that an autonomous Inspector General's organization paralleling the chain of command and a system of ad hoc honor boards at unit level could be useful, and most fundamentally that the managerial ethos must be rooted out and specifically rejected are of real interest. And they tackle the hard problem of how an existing organization, led by those who have prospered under the existing climate, may be persuaded to adopt and implement reformed values. They outline an interesting model for effecting value change in an organization, in effect a strategy for change, that seems to have applicability far beyond the particular problems they address. Thus they have gone beyond just articulating the problems and their causes, providing ideas on how to reform "an officer corps which has lost both its ethical bearings and the ability to develop and lead cohesive combat units." These are badly needed for, as they point out, so far "virtually no institutional changes have been undertaken."

But the authors are so determined to make their point that in some cases they go beyond the facts to advance arguments they should know are not correct. It was not, for example, "personal connections, educational background (the West Point Protective Association), and the ticket-punching calculus of career advancement" that resulted in numerous reserve officers being discharged during successive reductions in force, while sometimes less able regular officers continued to serve, but rather the statutory tenure that regular officers were accorded by law. The Army sought legislative relief from this dilemma for years, finally obtaining it, but not before much damage had been done. In contrasting the drop in ROTC enrollment and the increase in size of the officer corps during a given period, they neglect to mention that the Military Academy doubled in size during that time. And while they are critical of West Point in many respects, perhaps justifiably so, they base a number of their points on incorrect characterizations of the pedagogical practices there. This list could be extended.

But taken for what it is, an extended impressionistic essay, this book has value for anyone willing to entertain the notion that Chicken Little may have been right and interested in doing something about it.

LEWIS SORLEY
Central Intelligence Agency

Grayson, Benson L., ed. *The American Image of Russia: 1917-1977.* New York: Ungar, 1978. 388pp.

Gibert, Stephen P. *Soviet Images of America.* New York: Crane & Russak, 1977. 167pp.

Those who are looking for evidence to support a theory of convergence between Soviet and U.S. societies will find very little comfort in reading these two books. And those who naturally assume from the titles, that they will be looking at mirror images will also be surprised. The two books are not at all alike. In fact, in a rather curious way, they reflect the societies that produced them. *The American Image of Russia,* edited and with an introduction by a former scholar and foreign service officer, Benson Lee Grayson, presents no recognizable "image" but rather reflects a confusing diversity. *Soviet Images of America,* by Stephen P. Gibert, an academic consultant, describes a view that has the consistency of a theology with its customary concomitants of tediousness and irrationality.

Let it be said at the outset that we must be grateful for both books. *The American Image of Russia* brings together many important, and indeed interesting, articles and speeches assessing the Soviet Union. The range is heavily on the side of the decisionmakers, presidents, secretaries of state and ambassadors—a political "elite" as popular terminology would put it—and therefore gives us a rather unusual, nonacademic, perspective. The few statements by disappointed leftists—sounding like abandoned lovers—and now outdated Soviet supporters, sounding like the children of nature, give some sense of the extremes of informed opinion but no sense of explanation.

Reading John Reed between Herbert Hoover and Bainbridge Colby, a former Secretary of State, leads to intellectual hiccups. Nevertheless, John Reed, famous for his *Ten Days that Shook the World,* holds his own. One must admire his extraordinary power to reduce complex issues to resounding, but childlike, statements. He calls the Russian revolution an adventure "the most marvelous mankind ever embarked upon, sweeping into history at the head of the toiling masses and staking everything on their vast and simple desires." "Vast" their desires certainly were, but if they were "simple" then they were simple as the desires of God are.

The problem with a book like this, at least for this reviewer, is that it is not really the American "image" of Russia. Instead it is simply a collection of interesting articles and statements selected without any very apparent principle except for chronological order and an eye to the significance of the authors. Nevertheless, all of the articles are revealing and three or four contain significant information that is still often overlooked. For example, there is an excerpt from the *Autobiography of Lincoln Steffans,* the great American muckraker, in which he reports an interview with Lenin in 1919. Lenin argued for the necessity of a terror in order to exterminate the middle class or to force it out of Russia. We have become so used to accepting terror as one of the normal methods of the Soviet leaders and to the idea that the leader of their cult, Lenin, had a compassionate and humane core, that it comes as a shock to be reminded that he was as cruel as the rest from his earliest days in power.

Another fascinating selection, "Slave Labor," comes from a trade union newspaper. The article is interesting on two counts: because it is written by a member of the proletariat, the class in whose name the revolution was fought; and because it is unusual to see the proletariat represented in a collection of articles on the Soviet Union, a field dominated by intellectuals, journalists, and politicians. What could more

convincingly underscore the alienation of Soviet communism from its Marxist ideals, the transformation of a workers' utopia into the nightmare of the indentured servitude, than this proletarian damnation that starkly, shockingly, argues that the laborers in the Soviet Union are nothing more than slaves?

It is certainly a defect of the selection principle that some more balanced views are not presented. Surely there are apologists for the Soviet Union from the new left who make some sense. Surely something more conciliatory could have been found than the article reflecting the sweet innocence of Hubert Humphrey or another showing the political rationalizations of Lyndon Johnson. As it is, the brunt of the apologia is borne by Corliss Lamont, a writer and left politician. But his credibility foundered when he argued in the late fifties that the purge trials of the thirties were "genuine."

Considering their extraordinary importance, reaction to the purge trials of the thirties is not properly represented in this book. Where, for instance, are the bizarre statements of Joseph E. Davies, our Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1936? Based on his own extensive experience as a trial lawyer and statesman, he pronounced himself satisfied that the parade of old Bolsheviks, war heroes, and statesmen did indeed deserve to be shot for desiring to sell their fatherland to the Japanese, Swiss and Czechs.

Why is it so important to keep that incredible deception in the forefront of our consciousness? Because it shows us how prone we are to rationalize the irrational, to keep the surface of reality neat and orderly. Because he sent George Kennan out for sandwiches and was taken in by the trials, we dismiss Ambassador Davies now, but he was an adviser to Presidents, a distinguished man of his time and if he was taken in who would not have been? The answer cannot be neat.

In any case, that event, the purges, were an eruption from a rotten core of Soviet society, a core that remains unreconciled and uncontained. They were a culmination of events foreseen in the twenties by John Dos Passos and Emma Goldman, represented by two fascinating articles in this book, both idealists who wanted to believe in the Revolution, but who already saw the cruelty.

We must take the editor to task, however. Having compiled a volume of such fascinating but troubling reading, he cannot escape our legitimate demands for an explanation with the little inanity that concludes the introduction—"... the United States image of Russia will probably be determined primarily as it has for the past sixty years by the day-to-day and year-to-year actions of the Soviet Union and the responses of the United States government." If Grayson's selection of articles is not dishonest then that statement—if it is taken seriously at all, and obviously it should not be—is incorrect as well as vapid.

This book with all its defects of randomness and discontinuity may serve a major purpose, however, if it inspires a serious effort to analyze the love-hate relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States since the revolution. That task is a monumental one for which this book documents the need.

Soviet Images of America, by Stephen B. Gibert, a Georgetown professor, is a book that could not have been written in the Soviet Union. Even if speeches had been made there—and one may be fairly certain that they have not been—calling for patience, sympathy and understanding of America, they could not have been published. Thus it is up to foreign scholars to try to sort out the Soviet image of America, an image that must necessarily be doctrinaire, almost an icon of official thought.

Those who deal with primary Soviet sources must be very grateful to Gibert

for performing the very tedious job of sorting through the endless stream of parroted formulations that takes the place of political discussion in the Soviet Union. (The uninitiated may not be aware of the fact that following a year's worth of political tracts from the newspaper *Pravda* would be less interesting than reading a collection of Vatican speeches on abortion. What one watches for are variations in emphasis, changes in footnotes, renumberings of priorities. This does not make for very exciting reading, although we must all grant that it is quite essential reading if we want civilization to survive in a Western World.)

The problem Gibert faced was how to make a readable and convincing book. That is a considerable challenge, for not only is the original material tedious, but American readers tend not to believe standard Soviet statements. They seem to take the position that Comrade Marshal, two-time winner of the Order of Lenin, Central Committee Member Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov does not really mean what he says about the need to eliminate the American threat. The process by which the American reader comes to that conclusion is never clear. Nor is it ever clear what Comrade Marshal Ivanov means if he did not mean what he said. Why, one wonders, is it more comforting to the American intellectual to deal with a world in which no one means what he says? How, one wonders, does the American think that the Soviets organize their vast country so that everyone repeats the same tedious formulations that indeed no one means?

Gibert's technique for dealing with these problems was to open with some pretty big and frightening guns. He recalled the failures of perception about the Japanese, the Sino-Soviet split, the Cuban situation, the Yom Kippur war and so on. The point is well made, therefore, that we should not trust our judgments and should be wary of our preconceptions.

The reader naturally hopes that Gibert will put the problem of perceptions in some reasonable order. However that hope is soon dashed when he writes:

> With regard to Russian perceptions, however, it may be possible to affect those views which do not lie at the core of their national self image, and are not fundamental to the Marxist-Leninist belief system. And of course, as some people are more receptive to religious teachings than others, so also can it be assumed that convictions about communism and its apocalyptic view of the future vary among Soviet leaders.

How could Gibert, who, in preparing this book, must have steeped himself in little beyond war, revolution and death—60 of the cruelist years in history—propose such a bland formulation? Or is that his terrifying message? That there is nothing else to do but to try to trim around the edges?

Gibert's cullings of materials from the Soviet press is quite useful. The book is indeed "very valuable and informative," fulfilling the hope expressed for it by Richard Foster in his introduction. Methodologically, however, it does not help us to assess the degree to which the Soviets are serious about what they say. Perhaps that is an effort that Foster, the Stanford Research Institute, and Gibert will undertake next. We can hope so.

ROBERT B. BATHURST
Harvard University

Herz, Martin F., ed. *Decline of the West? George Kennan And His Critics.* Washington Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, 1978. 173pp.

If you want a place in history, scribble! This rule has been upheld as valid back in time through Machiavelli to Thucydides at least—both statesmen and commanders out of power, left to

write about it. The silent statesman bows to the articulate scribe. Historical scholarship is built with documentary bricks and the art of the chronicler. He who writes history determines it; and ideas reshape facts.

So it has been with George F. Kennan. His contribution to the world has been his writing, not his accomplishment in action as a diplomatist. His has been a great contribution, not least because of his genius with words. There is an old story told in the State Department to the effect that Dean Acheson used to take George Kennan's memoranda on policy and assign them to an aide for rewriting. Supposedly the aide was instructed to paraphrase them into standard, pedestrian State Department prose and then return them to Acheson for consideration of the recommendations. Acheson did not wish to be seduced or beguiled by Kennan's eloquence as he considered the substance of Kennan's thought.

If you have the ability to coin an epigram, or write a truly memorable phrase, you had better be careful which way your gun is pointed. After successfully articulating the rationale of U.S. policy in the cold war, Kennan has spent the past 30 years trying to undo his handiwork and curb the onrushing enthusiasm of his disciples. The result has been that Kennan has moved from advocacy of "firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world," to the following position: "Let us divest ourselves of this (nuclear) weapon altogether; let us stake our safety on God's grace and our own good consciences and on that measure of common sense and humanity which even our adversaries possess . . . ."

So George Kennan has become a neoisolationist, willing even to say: "Rather red than dead." But such is his eminence and eloquence that distinguished scholars have made careers on interpreting and reinterpreting his thought. The little book under review is just such a reinterpretation.

Point by point, Kennan's opponents appear to have the better of the argument. This is largely due to Kennan's self-assurance in taking incautious positions. For example, Kennan says: "I don't believe in the ability of the Russians to control Western Europe. They just would not know how. They are too crude and clumsy for any such exploits." Having been in Prague myself in 1948, when the Communists took power there, and having seen how Soviet planes and tanks restored Soviet influence in Czechoslovakia in 1968, I am skeptical of Kennan's assertion. Czechoslovakia is an advanced nation, too.

If the foregoing is true, however, it becomes all the more worthwhile to find and savor Kennan's insights as he has much to say to all of us, as always. He speaks wisely of the limits of power. As Eugene Rostow says, "Kennan is an impressionist, a poet, not an earthling."

The book is derivative, consisting of reprints from a variety of sources. Martin F. Herz, the editor, contributes only six pages of his own to the text. That is a pity as Herz also writes well.

But the book is worth reading. It deals with the central foreign policy question of our times. Kennan's thought has dominated our intellectual perception of the Russian-American relationship for 30 years. His shadow will extend far into the future. Those who wish to understand recent history and ponder the prospects ahead must contend with George Kennan, one way or another.

AMBASSADOR NATHANIEL DAVIS
Naval War College

Johnson, David. *Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978. 191pp.

If you are interested in fascinating details about the French Imperial

Cavalry, this is a book for you. Moreover, David Johnson provides vignettes about the lives of Napoleon's cavalry generals and gives precise narrations of numerous cavalry engagements.

What is lacking in this book is any attempt at an analysis of the French Cavalry's organization, tactics, and development. There is no attempt to compare the social composition of the cavalry with other branches of the French Army. Finally, the author does not attempt to render any overall judgement on the utility of the mounted arm during the Napoleonic Wars.

Still, one must not be too harsh. Johnson's book is well written and profusely illustrated. It illuminates many interesting and important details of the cavalry's services.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

Middleton, Drew. *The Duel of the Giants: China and Russia in Asia.* New York: Scribner, 1978. 231pp.

Drew Middleton, the military correspondent of *The New York Times,* toured China for 3 weeks in the autumn of 1976 as the guest of the People's Republic of China. This popularly written book chronicles his impressions of that trip. It is a book mainly about China. The flavor is sympathetic to the Chinese, although he does not hesitate to point out Chinese shortcomings. The duel is seen through Chinese eyes: they are preparing against an attack by technologically superior "polar bears" from the North.

Can the People's Liberation Army withstand a Soviet conventional attack? Middleton doesn't see how, given present Chinese doctrine, training and logistics. The Chinese advantages lie in manpower and morale. Could the Chinese nation eventually consume a Soviet Army in a protracted struggle? Middleton would not be willing to so predict. (The Russian novelist Andrei Amalrik did predict that outcome in the suppressed *1984.*)

Given the likelihood of some successful Soviet military action against China, the issue for Moscow, according to Middleton, is whether to attack before China can modernize the PLA or to wait for political change to make a military solution unnecessary. The risk in waiting is that in 20 years, after Chinese military modernization, an attack could have much less chance of success.

Although the Soviets have assembled a large force on the border and in Outer Mongolia (43 divisions (reinforced), with hundreds of tactical nuclear missiles and 900-1400 modern air defense and close support aircraft), and their doctrine and tactics are those of blitzkrieg, it is possible that the Soviet purpose is political and defensive. That is, the Red Army is so strong that if China should try any means but negotiation to resolve differences, Moscow would respond militarily with lightning speed and deadly intensity. This, of course, is only one assessment of Soviet intentions, and Middleton credits it to Lt. Gen. DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., USA, Commandant of the Army War College. Another assessment would be that Moscow's drive for détente and confirmed national borders in Europe in the early seventies was done to free Soviet forces for offensive action against China. Military operations could be imminent. Middleton discusses both the "garrison" and the "striking force" assessments, but does not choose. Instead, he falls back on the Churchillian description of Russia as an enigma.

Chapters 6 through 10 of this book are particularly good. Here Middleton analyzes the installations, organization, logistics, equipment, and tactics of, and military prospects for both sides. This kind of analysis is his forte. What becomes clear is that although the Soviets have marked advantages in almost all military accounts over the Chinese, they are nonetheless faced with

serious problems in sustaining an intense conflict with China. Perhaps the most important corrective step they have taken is to construct, at great expense, the $1.5 billion Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) to the north of the vulnerable Trans-Siberian. Even so, their consumption could exceed their resupply capability in a war with China.

For their part, the Chinese seem to contemplate surviving Soviet conventional or nuclear strikes and winning a protracted struggle. Although they undoubtedly would fire their modest force of nuclear missiles if attacked by Soviet missiles, the Chinese strategy relies heavily on passive defense. They showed these passive defenses to Middleton. In Chapter 10 he describes the underground fortress system engineered by the Chinese people early in this decade. For those readers who have heard of Chinese tunnel technology but are not fully conversant with all the Chinese have done, Middleton provides the best information in print so far.

In an important strategic assessment, Middleton concludes that there is little hope for permanent reconciliation between Peking and Moscow. He says "The quarrel may abate. There even may be a rapprochement . . . , even though this would require a revolution in national and ideological outlooks by both parties. But this would lead only to a temporary truce, for the roots of conflict run too deep."

Although parts of this book already have been dated by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by China and Japan, for the serious student of the Sino-Soviet rift it should provide eyewitness flavor and some new insights. For a reader entering this fascinating field for the first time, *Duel of the Giants* will be an eye opener.

WILLIAM A. PLATTE
Captain, U.S. Navy

Mooney, Michael and Stuber, Florian, eds. *Small Comforts For Hard Times.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 402pp.

This collection of 25 essays deals with five broad themes: justice and human equality, private rights and the public good, technology and the ideal of human progress, war and social order, and education and the good society. The product of an extensive series of conferences on the humanities and public policy issues, the collection takes as its premise that "the humanities give light when used as aids to the understanding of current urgencies." I found no real comfort in these educators', lawyers', philosophers', architects', and doctors' debate on urgent public issues, nor light cast on the dark social problems these humanists purport to analyze. Unfortunately, the positive proposals and recommendations are often obscured by a competitive erudition that characterizes many of the selections. However, if one is interested in some novel and interesting concepts of our society, in addition to straightforward, no nonsense discussions of anthropocentricity, broethics, neomorts, the social versus the scientific meaning of buildings, embourgeoisement, the rights of rocks, and the decline of humanities in secondary education, this is definitely a book for his shelf.

As an anthology of relatively short pieces, each broken down into subsections, the book provides those with specific interests an opportunity to pick and choose by author or subject. Some of the selections are enjoyable reading and their ideas are clearly set forth in simple prose, but the book as a work requires painfully slow and detailed reading, partly because of the complexity of the subjects and partly because writers must feel a compulsion to cast their ideas in an obscure, obtuse, pedantic manner. In my view, the standout selections include:

"Justice–Compensatory and Distributive"–A thoughtful discussion of discrimination and reverse discrimination using Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* as a base.

"Private Rights and the Public Good"–An argument that the private rights and public good are not an either/or situation and that our traditional framework for analyzing them may be outmoded.

"On Privacy and Community"–Treats the terms privacy and community as related and attempts to define privacy in terms of community.

"Do Rocks Have Rights"–Interesting argument for environmental ethics and the recovery of our traditional ethical perspective.

"Living With Scarcity"–The problems of scarcity (hunger, pain, and deprivation) will not be solved by technology alone but the author offers a plan liberally injected with both ethics and technology, for coping with scarcity.

"The Technology of Life and Death"–Fascinating approach to the implications of the traditional definition of death and effect of some suggested changes on our society.

"Reflections on War, Utopias and Temporary Systems"–Calls for the concentration of society's energies on extending the institutions that elicit man's more noble qualities, some of which are found in war and not in utopia.

"The University and American Society"–Supports the tenets of liberal education and stresses the importance of the study of humanities in the context of the development of American education and its place in society today.

"Some Questions in General Education Today"–Discusses the dilemma of technical training versus education and the reproductive qualities that a liberal education imparts to a society. Marcus offers some suggestions to reduce the reparative nature of higher education.

In sum, there are some small comforts in the book. I think that it's a handy guide to looking at macropublic issues in a different, often unique manner. The comforts, however, are sufficiently small that their availability in the local library is sufficient.

JOHN P. MORSE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Morgan, William J., et al., eds. *Autobiography of Rear Admiral Charles Wilkes, U.S. Navy, 1798-1877.* Washington: Naval History Division, 1978. 930pp.

The Naval History Division has published, with a minimum of editorial comment, the lengthy autobiography of Charles Wilkes, the officer who commanded the U.S. Exploring Expedition in 1838-1842, and who removed the Confederate Commissioners Mason and Slidell from the British packet steamer *Trent* in 1862. Both events were controversial then, and remain so today. But this newly available volume does not illuminate either event so well as it does the bizarre personality of Wilkes himself, who stands condemned by his own hand in these pages as petty, sanctimonious and tyrannical.

The best part of the book is Wilkes' account of his years as a midshipman in the old sailing navy of the 1820s and 30s. But as he progresses in rank, his account assumes more and more the character of a diatribe: his commanding officers were out to get him; the Secretary of the Navy was his enemy; all his subordinates were incompetent, mutinous, or both. What is surprising is not that Wilkes was twice court-martialed for his imperious activities when in command at sea, but that he was ever *given* a command at sea.

A recent volume by William Stanton entitled *The Great United States Exploring Expedition of 1838-1842* (Berkeley, 1975) in which Wilkes is portrayed as a stiff martinet is herein

afforded ample reinforcement. Wilkes writes that his lieutenants (many of whom later signed a testimonial against him) were "scum . . . mean and cowardly." But Wilkes' accounts of his own action provide more than sufficient grounds for their protests.

As for the *Trent* affair, which so nearly brought England into the American Civil War on behalf of the Confederacy, Wilkes has relatively little to say except that he believed "I had done nothing more than my duty and should do it again if placed under similar circumstances." As for the courts-martial that followed both incidents, Wilkes claims that Secretaries of the Navy Upshur and Welles were both incompetent scoundrels who drummed up charges against him out of jealousy and political partisanship. Though the courts were packed against him, he writes, he was able to overcome their prejudice because of the manifest virtue of his actions.

Much of the volume is filled with trivial travelogues of Wilkes' summer trips and family life, but the active duty portions provide an interesting view of this 19th century Captain Queeg.

CRAIG SYMONDS
U.S. Naval Academy

Overholt, William H., ed. *Asia's Nuclear Future*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. 285pp.

In a world of perplexing problems, nuclear proliferation stands as one of the most perplexing. Replete with ethnocentric pitfalls, technical complexities and substantial dangers for global stability, the prospect of nuclear spread has challenged the thoughtful and the thoughtless alike. Perhaps even more distressing than the specter of "living in a nuclear-armed crowd," has been the proliferation of books and articles on the subject, many with only the saving grace that they evidence short half-lives. Fortunately, this is not the case with *Asia's Nuclear Future*, which proves to be a thoughtful book that enhances our understanding of this important issue, rather than merely adding to the din.

Edited by William Overholt of the Hudson Institute, *Asia's Nuclear Future* consists of seven chapters, two of which previously appeared as journal articles. The thematic thread for the volume is provided in the opening chapter by Lewis Dunn (also of Hudson) and Overholt. Eschewing the country-by-country study and the action-reaction dyad as appropriate frameworks for the study of proliferation, they proffer a new metaphor, the "nuclear proliferation chain." Dunn and Overholt argue: "the decision by the initial country to go nuclear triggers a proliferation chain encompassing anywhere from two to ten additional proliferation decisions." Thus, one chain includes India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Israel, Brazil and Argentina.

While the "chain" metaphor offers great promise for briefing charts, it is hard to concede that an analytical breakthrough has occurred; the "discovery" seems to be that a state's decisions in the nuclear realm are unlikely to be ignored in the international milieu. Nonetheless, the explication of interrelationships is a useful and commendable enterprise that the interested reader will find informative. In a later chapter Dunn develops the "India, Pakistan, Iran . . . " chain; however, one would have hoped that the frugal contribution (15 pages) had been considerably expanded, given the enormity of the subject matter. Overholt's subsequent chapter on Eastern Asia is somewhat meatier, and he does provide interesting discussion of both the Korean and the Taiwanese cases. In both cases he concludes that nuclear weapons would be a rather poor second to the preferred "weapon"—continuing security ties with the United States. Overholt's analysis can only remind us that a precipitous

diminution of security assistance and troop deployment may be more painful in the long run than the maintenance of such support.

Two Harvard-based contributors, Jonathan D. Pollack, a China expert, and Onwar Marwah, an authority on the Indian nuclear program, provide competent contributions on the Chinese and Indian programs respectively. Pollack demonstrates to this reviewer's satisfaction that the principled Chinese doctrine that nuclear weapons are only instruments of defense is both supported by known deployments and the product of a carefully thought out—even plodding—policy. Marwah's somewhat sympathetic account of the Indian program from 1950-1976 is a useful overview of the Indian case (which perhaps should even be traced to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission in 1948).

In a frankly exciting 55-page chapter (that alone is worth the price of this book), Herbert Passin, a Columbia University authority on Japan, attacks and demolishes a number of preconceptions that often cloud any effort to understand the prospect of Japanese development of nuclear weapons. Using relatively recent and varied public opinion survey data, Passin argues that contrary to the common wisdom: younger Japanese are *more*, rather than less, opposed to higher levels of armament; that the Japanese public is more concerned about raw material, energy and market problems than foreign military threats (although he does seem to depreciate security concerns, thus contradicting the very data he provides); that South Korea is not deemed vital to Japanese security; that in fact, Japan is most likely to remain neutral in the event of a renewed Korean conflict; and, that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is neither of one voice on nuclear weapons, nor the only significant force in military policy. Passin describes the broad public consensus as follows:

> The mainstream of Japanese opinion is today against the adoption of nuclear weapons. Although some conservatives may be willing to contemplate their necessity some time in the future, there is virtually complete agreement that they are not for Japan today.

Passin then concludes with an informed consideration of those factors that may lead to the nuclear decision. Notably, the loss of U.S. credibility leads the list, only to be closely followed by the not farfetched possibility of a sharp break with the United States. Seventeen thought-provoking scenarios for Japanese development of nuclear weapons are provided by Passin, several of which deserve careful contemplation. In sum, Passin's chapter is an important contribution to the literature and will no doubt be widely recognized as such.

Asia's Nuclear Future concludes with a splendid chapter by William Overholt in which he treats the U.S. nuclear posture in Asia. His keen and provocative comments on U.S. nuclear deployments in Korea are especially important. He extensively discusses the dilemma of forward-based nuclear weapons that offer only three unattractive options in the event of a serious attack: early use, capture or ignominious retreat. To correct this unsavory situation, he proposes rear-basing (outside of Korea), which while adding geographical separation would still allow delivery without delay (given the timelag for Executive approval regardless of locale). Such proposals are particularly appropriate, given the geography of Korea which is rather well disposed to a nonnuclear defense.

In conclusion, *Asia's Nuclear Future*, while somewhat uneven (this seems to be *de rigueur* for any edited work) offers a timely and informed discussion of a most important question. An index and bibliography would have considerably improved the usefulness of the book. While the book tends to be rather

more speculative and less technically informed than many readers would prefer, it is still a solid contribution to the literature.

AUGUSTUS R. NORTON
Major, U.S. Army

Smith, Charles E. *From the Deep of the Sea.* Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1977. 288pp.

Little has remained the same in the century and a half since Cunningham wrote:

The hollow oak our palace is,
Our heritage the sea.

What one hopes has not changed is the spirit of the men who can claim that heritage and can include in it the experiences of a surgeon in a 355-ton whaling ship that sailed from Hull on 19 February 1866 and returned 14 months later with what was left of a ragged, scurvy-ridden, starving crew.

The whaling done by *Diana* and indeed all of the ships of Hull was not the 2 or 3-year voyages as the Americans made to the South Seas but was a seasonal trek to the Greenland Seas, the first weeks devoted to sealing and then up through Davis Strait and into Baffin Bay for the whales. Stores were taken for a voyage of about 8 months.

Ship's Surgeon Smith, whose diary this book is, was making his first trip to sea and he recorded everything that interested him—the ship, the sea, the sailors, fish, seals, flowers, birds, literally everything, even sea stories that seemed pertinent to his activities.

By mid-July *Diana* had caught two whales, no seals, and was near the mouth of Ponds Bay in Baffin Bay's upper reaches. Where fishing should have been best, *Diana* (and other ships in the area) found nothing but gales and ice. Toward the first of August the season, such as it was, was obviously over and it was time for "haim to my ain countree." August was spent trying to find a way out through the rapidly increasing ice. Baffin Land to the West, ice to the south, and contrary winds forced the ship to make her way north and east to Melville Bay on the northwest coast of Greenland and to try to make her southing from there. But conditions were worse so she returned to the west water. Several times *Diana* was pinched in the ice and only by putting sailors with hawsers on the ice (and overfiring the boiler of her 30hp engine) did she warp herself free and often that was into a hole of water from which there was no exit. Another whaler, *Intrepid*, fell in with *Diana* and for a few days they searched together for a way out. *Intrepid*, with 60hp and 90 tons of coal, promised not to forsake *Diana* but on 1 September *Intrepid* managed to force her way into clear water and, perhaps thinking *Diana* would be able to follow, sailed out of sight.

For three weeks *Diana* sailed among the gathering floes, seeking the open ocean, but on 21 September the captain determined that his only course was to drive the ship into the icepack, from which it might be liberated in April, and drift with it into the Atlantic. The ship had already been on short rations for a month, could continue that rate of consumption for 2 months, but could expect to be in the ice for 6 months with no hope of adding fish, fowl, or animal to the larder.

The impressionable reader should read the rest of the diary in the heat of August when well fed and well rested. Fuel ran out and pieces of the ship not necessary for shelter or for ultimate safe navigation were burned. Finally, only a small fire to boil tea and thaw food was allowable. Ice formed on the cabin bulkheads, in the men's clothing and bedding; the whale-oil lamps had to be warmed before they would light; the clock refused to operate; and pumps that had to be operated continually to keep the ship afloat (ice pressure had opened many of her seams) had to be

dismantled several times each day to clear them of ice. Breakfasts were half a biscuit spread with cook's fat (which Smith described as brown axle grease), dinners the same with the addition of an ounce or so of boiled meat or oatmeal or suet. By late February, everyone on board looked forward to the twice-a-week banquet of soup made of biscuit dust and table scraps that the cook had providentially saved early in the voyage with a view to selling it as pig's food on return to Hull. The captain died the day after Christmas of cold and fatigue. Scurvy was first detected in early January (with only three gallons of inferior—later frozen—lime juice on board) and the first scurvy death occurred in mid-February.

Some breakup of the ice began in early March and after 2 weeks of struggle *Diana* was free of the ice and homeward bound on 17 March, arriving in the Shetlands on 2 April. Two of the 13 men who died (of a crew of 51) did so within sight of home.

The diary teaches no strategic, tactical, nor even seamanship lessons. It is inconceivable that any seaman of today could find himself in similar circumstances. But some men continue to be called on to cope with conditions seemingly unendurable. And some of them find something to draw on, to sustain them and that they did and do so and how they did and do it are worthy of our attention, if not to instruct us then to inspire us.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Sobel, Lester A., ed. *Political Terrorism, Volume 2: 1974-78.* New York: Facts on File, 1978. 279pp.

Sobel, Lester A., *Palestinian Impasse: Arab Guerrillas & International Terror.* New York: Facts on File, 1977. 282pp.

The public is constantly blitzed with "barometers," "indicators" and "indexes" that purport to measure everything from the economy to morale in the military. While there is no precise index for the effect of contemporary political terrorism on our collective consciousness, there can be no doubt that the terrorism phenomena would rate very highly on any such scale. Consider for example that one standard library reference lists over 40 nonfiction books "in print" on the subject of terrorism and that this represents a doubling over a 2-year period. Or consider the hundreds of novels (ranging from literature to thrillers to pulps) that feature casts of terrorists whose aspirations range from survival to controlling the world.

Unfortunately, most works on terrorism—whether fiction or nonfiction, and sometimes a single book will be a blend of each—present a point of view that is by definition colored by the prejudices of its author. It is simply difficult to get the facts without an accompanying sermon on the depravity (or virtuousness) of terrorism by subnational groups (or governments). Thus, it is very refreshing to find sources for factual accounts that allow the reader to draw his own conclusions.

Both *Palestinian Impasse* and *Political Terrorism* are straightforward presentations of facts, and do allow the reader to draw his own conclusions. Published by the Facts on File Corporation, renowned for its standard library reference of the same name, each book represents a compilation of the significant news and developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the problem of terrorism respectively.

Palestinian Impasse treats the developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1967 war up to the middle of 1977, while *Political Terrorism, Volume 2* provides coverage from 1974 to May 1978 (the cutoff seems to have been the murder of Aldo Moro). The terrorism volume is organized geographically, with very strong sections of the Middle East and Latin America, while the other

volume is organized more or less chronologically.

As might be expected, there is considerable overlap between the two volumes in the treatment of the Middle East, but this is probably defensible. The only real deficiency appears to be the indexes, which could have been rather more complete. For example, the terrorist incident at the December 1975 meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna is treated succinctly in *Political Terrorism*, but the reader would never find it in the index (whether he searched under "OPEC," "Vienna," "Austria," or any of the fedayeen organizations, or for that matter "Carlos"—who after all led the raid). This is an important criticism, as the greatest value of books such as these is as reference works. It should also be indicated, as the reader may have already noted, that *Palestinian Impasse* is far broader in scope than its subtitle would indicate.

Those who are interested in the subjects encompassed by these books—whether professionally or avocationally—will find *Palestinian Impasse* and *Political Terrorism* useful sources for the raw data. Neither of the books have great armchair reading potential, but they do deserve consideration for inclusion in private and institutional libraries.

AUGUSTUS R. NORTON
Major, U.S. Army

Southworth, Herbert Rutledge. *Guernica! Guernica!* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 537pp.

Herbert Southworth is a certified aficionado of the Spanish Civil War, and this 500-page study is a reflection of this interest. It is without doubt the most heavily researched and documented restatement of the ex post facto obvious since Will Shakespeare's would-be lover was subjected to literary scrutiny.

Subtitled "A study of journalism, diplomacy, propaganda and history," it is exactly that. The difficulty, if one may express this view, is that it features overkill. The subject is the devastation by Axis/rebel bombing of the Basque center of Guernica in April 1937. It was the first major application of terror bombing of civilians as Europe practiced for the tasks of World War II.

For 500 pages we refight the propaganda event following upon the murderous 3-hour attack. There is no doubt today that Franco forces were responsible, and, for that matter, even on that eventful day, there was no doubt who carried out the bombing. There were, after all, victims, survivors, and eyewitnesses. Yet, surprisingly enough, the intervening years led to a sordid battle between Spanish loyalists and rebels and their international supporters about who really carried out the raid.

The book pursues each and every lead, each and every article, and each and every charge and countercharge, down to the present. It becomes tedious as the propagandists beclouded the issue. Yet, one question remains and eventually Southworth airs it: why Guernica, a small, but historically important Basque symbol?

The answer, something of a shocker, goes back into the ideological history of the era, pitting the Catholics against the "Reds." The reality, it would seem, is to be found in the psychological contradiction, offensive to the nationalists, that Spanish Basque Catholics were largely loyal to the republic, alleged to be Communist. One could not easily mount an international campaign based on the Catholic right, if an important historic enclave of Catholic Spain remained loyal. Thus, the Condor Legion employed its skill to break the Basque morale and support.

I found the book too long, though professionally done. The viciousness of that civil war was amply demonstrated, and to me the cynicism and utter

unscrupulousness of the international defenders and detractors both to this day represents a low point in the history of ideology.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Stuart, Bérault, Seigneur d'Aubigny, *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre*. Edited by Élie de Comminges. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. 77pp. *(International Archives of the History of Ideas*, v. 85.)

This treatise on the art of war was written in the early 16th century by a Frenchman of Scottish descent. He was a man who had had a great deal of experience in war and diplomacy during the period of the first series of wars that France fought in her attempt to dominate Italy. It was a complicated period in diplomatic and military history, but it is one that reveals the beginnings of the modern pattern in international relations.

Bérault accompanied King Charles VIII of France on the 1494 invasion of Italy and was sent on diplomatic missions to Florence, Milan, Naples, Mantua, Ferrara and Rome in an effort to secure a free hand for France in his ambitions. However, the epaliton of opposing princes in the Holy League forced France to retreat. At the high point in the first invasion, just following the French capture of Naples, Bérault was appointed commander of French forces in Calabria and later fought the army of Gonzaga de Cordoba and Ferdinand II of Spain. When Naples was lost to Spain, Bérault and his army were withdrawn, but the dream of French conquest in Italy was not forgotten. In 1500, Louis XII launched another attempt. This time, Bérault was named Governor of Milan and later, envoy to Naples and Calabria. As a lieutenant general, Bérault commanded a victorious French Army at Terranova. In the end, however, the French were defeated and Bérault, himself, surrendered at Rocca Angistola after a long siege. The final outcome of the war proved Spain's ability to defend her position as a Mediterranean power by controlling Italy as well as Sardinia and Sicily. Following the end of the war, Bérault was returned from imprisonment and resumed his service to France. He died in Edinburgh in 1508 while on a mission that combined an official embassy to England and Scotland with a personal pilgrimage to the Shrine of St. Ninian at Whithorn, the first Christian church in Scotland.

This edition of the *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre* is a collation of six known manuscripts and one early 16th-century printed version. The scholarly apparatus, introduction, notes, and appendices are longer than Bérault's 24-page work, but they do provide fascinating and useful information with which to understand it. Élie de Comminges has edited the document with great care and erudition. All of the material presented in this edition adds something to our knowledge of Bérault and to the history of the Italian wars. The document, itself, is written in 16th century French which requires some expertise to read. However, that task is eased for us by the editor's contribution.

Bérault's study is an important example of that large body of military writing influenced by Vegetius's *Epitoma Rei Militaris*. While Bérault is certainly part of that tradition, his work is also notably different. He appears to be the first modern soldier-diplomat to cite examples of his own time and experience rather than to limit himself to the events of classical history. Bérault's work has five chapters: how to conquer a country, how to besiege a city, what to do when a country is invaded, how to defend strong places, and the order of battle for war. In addition to drawing upon classical history, he effectively illustrates his points from his own knowledge and experience in all of these areas. The result is a series of maxims

that are concise, full of sound advice for a contemporary soldier, and strictly practical. Undoubtedly they were intended to be published as a guide for future leaders.

The general views Bérault expressed were not new but the unique aspect of them lies in the personal element that he added to a work on the art of warfare. As such it is substantially different, but far overshadowed by Fourquevaux' *Instructions sur le Facit de la Guerre*, the most famous and widely quoted 16th-century military work. Élie de Comminges has made a substantial contribution to the study of military writing by making Bérault's work more widely available.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College, Oxford

van Creveld, Martin. *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 284pp.

General works on the history of logistics are few and far between, and even studies of logistics in particular campaigns are far outnumbered by tactical and strategic studies. *Supplying War* attempts to give a broad outline of the development of logistics between the Thirty Years' War and World War II. In a subsequent article ("Supplying an Army: An Historian's View," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, June 1978, pp. 56-63), van Creveld summarizes his argument and carries it on to the present day.

In approaching his subject, van Creveld asks some of the basic questions appropriate to a study of the influence of logistics on strategy: what were the logistics factors limiting an army's operations? What arrangements were made to move it and keep it supplied while moving? How did these arrangements affect the course of the campaign, both as planned and as carried out? These are extremely important questions, and the task of finding answers to them is an important and useful one. However, the title of the book misleads the reader into assuming that the author's subject is much broader than it is. It is not a book about supplying war, but a study of army logistics. The broader aspects of war logistics that must surely include some reference to national finance, the interrelationship of land, sea, and later, air forces, the structure of coalitions when they are used, the "friction" of bureaucracy, are not considered in any great extent. The subtitle defines the topic of supplying war as logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. The names of the men give us a clue that this is a book about armies, yet when we look into it, we discover that the subject covers only half of those 300 years. In fact, the book is about the period from Napoleon to Patton.

It is unfortunate that Dr. van Creveld has dismissed the 17th and 18th centuries summarily, for there would seem to be much more there for his subject than he allows. In terms of the British Army, for example, there are further points to be made about the operation of armies on distant stations. The operations of the army in Spain during the War of the Spanish Succession, across the Atlantic in the War for America, or in Spain during the Napoleonic wars offer additional perspectives. Some of these have already been studied by other scholars in terms of logistics. There is much more to be said about the Blenheim campaign of 1704, and these matters may be gleaned from the works of such German and Austrian historians as E. Ritter, Braubach and Mathis.

Van Creveld begins his study in earnest with the Ulm campaign of 1805 that he uses to illustrate an army living off the country. Then he begins to jump to a number of other campaigns in the following century and a half that illustrate other points. He uses the campaign of 1812 to show the inadequacy of

horse-drawn transport in the conditions of the Russian winter. The Franco-Prussian War is an illustration of the use of railroads and the inadequacy of transport from railheads. Nineteen hundred and fourteen is used to show the limitations on the military use of railroads. In World War II, he looks at the problem of the German Army in its eastern campaign struggling with the transition to a mechanized force, a transition that he shows was completed in the Allied forces by 1944. Finally, he looks at some of the unique aspects of Rommel's desert campaigns.

In the chapters on World War II, the author has made valuable use of his own research in German archives at Freiburg. In other chapters, he has supplemented published studies with reference to manuscripts in the Depot de Guerre, Vincennes, the Public Record Office in London, and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, now at King's College, London.

Despite the qualifications that one must have concerning the 17th and 18th centuries in this book and the narrowly defined understanding of war logistics, Dr. van Creveld makes a very important contribution by showing to us the largely untouched subject of logistics in war history. It is a thought-provoking study that one hopes will encourage further studies and reinterpretations in the field.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College, Oxford

Watson, Peter. *War on the Mind: the Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*. New York: Basic Books. 534pp.

This rather hefty volume by an author who is both a clinical psychologist and an editor of the London *Sunday Times* may be just what its dust jacket proclaims, "the most comprehensive work on the psychology of warfare ever published." Peter Watson assesses his subject under five broad divisions: Combat Stress, Determinants of Loyalty and Treason, Survival, and Psychology of Counter-Insurgency. He has pursued his inquiries in eight countries and estimates that there are 146 separate institutes where the subject is being investigated, "the overwhelming majority (130) in the United States." His annotation, in the back matter, is extensive though there is no bibliography.

In a tempered, near conversational style Watson probes into the welter of experimentation in his field now ongoing across the globe (mainly non-Communist). He pinpoints the U.S. Army's psychological warfare school at Fort Bragg as "the most sophisticated institution of its kind in the world." He has interesting things to say about a variety of intriguing experiments, e.g., tactual communications, distinctions between leadership and command, assessments of the personality type liable to commit atrocities, or the manipulation potential of witchcraft and sorcery. Some of his commentary is extensive and persuasive, such as the sections on interrogation and brainwashing; some is skimpy, such as that dealing with animals as weapons.

It is in certain of his conclusions that the author may give one pause. He thinks, for example, that politicomilitary research ought "to be carried out openly, or at least to be published openly, so that it can be freely reviewed and criticized and its implications fully aired." Again: "the deliberate development of weapons of unnecessary suffering . . . is out," because ideas can be stolen and because scientists suffer from overheated imaginations anyway. Or: psywarriors come to learn so much about the makeup of a given enemy that they tend to laboratoryize him and so transform him into a "lesser human being."

But let it not be said that Watson is a fangs-bared antimilitarist. He concedes that "it has recently been shown that the military mind is *not* more ideological than the non-military mind; if any-

thing . . . it is more pragmatic." He is probably correct, too, in his belief that military psychologists could enrich their endeavors if they contrived somehow to keep fully abreast of what each was up to and toward this end Watson proposes yet another "institute."

In short, this volume may be perused with profit by all elements of the armed services. For senior officers it should fall little short of mandatory status. They will find it at once enlightening and exasperating.

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve (Ret.)

Webb, James. *Fields of Fire*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1978. 344pp.

The sound and smell of combat in Vietnam at the platoon level permeates *Fields of Fire* with a completeness that is extraordinary and a realism that is almost eerie. Webb's book reeks of gunpowder. It is unusual for an author's first work of fiction to be so real, particularly when describing combat and all its horrors. Webb also masterfully addresses the subleties of the personal relationships of soldiers at war.

This book is not only for those Americans who went to Vietnam. It will be an intense reading experience for others as well, primarily because of Webb's ability to paint a picture with words and to put his reader on the scene. Additionally, the glossary of terms included at the end of the book will translate all of the colloquialisms of marines in Vietnam into everyday language.

Fields of War is reality revisited. Set in 1968-69 in the vicinity of An Hoa, with such place names as Liberty Bridge, Go Noi Island, Arizona, Charley Ridge, and the Razorback easily recognizable to a generation of marines, the book conjures up memories long submerged.

The attitude of the "grunts" (infantry marines at the platoon and company level) in the book also portrays reality. There was a "Catch-22" feeling among marines in Vietnam that Webb accurately described in the dialogue. For example, ID cards were issued to the friendly populace so the VC/NVA could be identified. The net effect, however, was that VC/NVA acquired them, and the civilians lost them through VC intimidation or subversion. The resettlement village was set up to isolate the VC from the populace, but poeple weren't relocated there because corrupt politicians kept the village only half filled in order to pocket money intended for its support of the village. The destruction of rice was intended to starve the enemy and force him out of the mountains, but the effect was to starve the populace and alienate them, thus driving them to the enemy side.

The author's intimacy with combat marines is noticeable in his development of the grunts' outlook. For example, the grunt view of "pogues" (rear area personnel not involved in frequent contact with the enemy) was universal and vividly portrayed. The difference in attitude of grunts and pogues is reflected in the difference in priorities. What was important to a pogue didn't matter in the least to a grunt (at least generally speaking). The adjustments necessary when the platoon returned from the field to the combat base were realistic and at the same time amusing because the two areas were worlds apart. Webb sensitively portrayed the emptiness and frustration felt by men in Vietnam because of the feeling that nobody really cared. To what seemed to be the majority of the American public during 1968-69, Vietnam was just one more unpleasantness (and one that could be turned off—or at least ignored). The man in the trenches had a very hard time understanding why the America that sent him to war was not willing to support his effort in that war.

The combat in *Fields of Fire* is a mirrorlike image. The use of supporting

arms, the sweeps through the rice paddies, the anxiety of moving toward a village, the exhilaration of being shot at (and missed), the telltale signs and indicators of enemy presence, the reaction and movement during combat, the professional execution of responsibility by sometimes surprising people, all tell it like it is. Many readers of this book undoubtedly will recall the apprehension felt when the point man reported the absence of water buffalo in the fields surrounding the next hamlet. The impression that events occur in slow motion and with great focus and clarity during moments of actual combat seems, at first blush, to be odd, but the fact is that although the events are occurring at blinding speed, they are individual scenes on the screen of one's memory.

The relationships among the central characters sketched by Webb are highlights of the book, and the association of the platoon commander with his men was experienced by literally thousands of marines in Vietnam. The standoffishness and apprehension of both Lieutenant Hodges and the men in the platoon when he first arrived was a natural reaction. The description of Hodges, the central figure, growing into his responsibilities is beautifully done. His gradual acceptance by the platoon, followed by genuine comradeship with them, reflected on the professional as well as personal qualities of both Hodges and the platoon members. The dependence of these men upon each other was total and, although quietly aware of that fact, they didn't fully understand the concept and all that it portended. Webb's treatment of these relationships and the men's dependence upon each other is well done. Dependence is developed throughout the book and its lessons are brought to a convincing climax in the final chapter. Although one would not expect the combat veterans in Hodges' platoon to admit it, the central theme in the book is man's love for his fellow man and the love and mutual respect that develop among warriors in combat.

Webb's portrayal of the new man in the unit was poignantly and accurately painted. The feeling one experiences when he is the new kid on the block is unforgettable. Likewise, Webb's development of the "new guy" turning into an "old guy" over a period of time and the personal effects of combat reflect his intimacy with the environment and his sensitivity in understanding marines. Webb's presentation of the concept that combat affects different people differently is subtle but enduring.

The sadistic sense of humor displayed by the central characters is magnificently presented. There was nothing —absolutely nothing—sacred among the grunts in Vietnam, and *Fields of Fire* is chock-full of humorous (perhaps shocking for the uninitiated) vignettes.

A comparison of *Rumor of War* and *Fields of Fire* will strongly favor the latter. Both books accurately describe and reflect combat in Vietnam at the platoon level, even though the situation and terrain are different. However, there is a sense of negativism that pervades *Rumor of War* from start to finish, and the reader is left with a sense of disappointment and frustration at its conclusion. Conversely, *Fields of Fire*, despite the ultimate demise of all the central characters, is positive in tone and at the end the reader is disappointed only because there is no more good reading.

The only weakness in *Fields of Fire* is the shallow treatment given the complexities of the Vietnamese people. Lieutenant Hodges and the members of his platoon did not understand the Vietnamese people, their culture and their environment and yet this was one of the greatest difficulties of the Vietnam war—the difference between the American and Vietnamese people and their values and the inability of American money, firepower and lives to

bridge the gap. On the other hand, this lack of understanding was a common failing in Vietnam, and Webb's book deserves credit for presenting the issue as it really was. Nonetheless, some readers will undoubtedly recoil at the characters' inability to put events into perspective at several points in the book.

In summation, *Fields of Fire* is a solid piece of war fiction made better because it closely paralleled actual events. It is an outstanding war story and an accurate and detailed reflection of combat in the vicinity of Liberty Bridge in 1968-69. While the reviewer has not read all the books about Vietnam, he has read most of them. *Fields of Fire* is unquestionably the best. The rest aren't even close.

FRED T. FAGAN, JR.
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski, and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Adler, Mortimer J. *Aristotle for Everybody.* New York: Macmillan, 1978. 204pp. $8.95
In this exposition Adler seeks to introduce the layman to the fundamentals of philosophical searching as well as to Aristotle's thought.

Blanchard, Benjamin S. *Design and Manage to Life Cycle Cost.* Portland, Ore: M/A Press, 1978. 255pp. $24.95
Life cycle cost analysis is a concept for management based on the total cost of a project or system rather than segments of cost, such as development or production. Case studies play a vital part in Blanchard's treatment of the subject.

British Defence Policy in a Changing World. London: Croom Helm, 1977. 295pp. £9.95
This compilation contains ten detailed thematic studies that treat significant strategic and organizational aspects of British defense policy since 1945. Taken together, the essays provide a comprehensive picture of British policy as a whole from the perspectives of economists, historians, and political scientists.

Budnick, Frank S., et al. *Principles of Operations Research for Management.* Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1977. 756pp. $17.95
An eight-step decision paradigm is the basis for this comprehensive survey of the concepts of operations research techniques and their application to decisionmaking.